The Morality of Abortion
Eliot Stier
PHIL 104: Introduction to Ethics
11/9/09
The Morality of Abortion
Abortion can either be moral or immoral, depending on the context it’s in. A woman who has taken pains to prevent a pregnancy, or been raped and had the pregnancy forced upon her should have the right to an abortion. However we cannot show ourselves as reducing the value of life because a baby would be an inconvenience. We must respect life enough to only abort fetuses in the most extreme cases.
“Except in such cases as the unborn person has a right to demand it–and we were leaving open the possibility that there may be such cases–nobody is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other interests and concerns, of all other duties and commitments, for nine years, or even for nine months, in order to keep another person alive….” [1]
A fetus is often thought of as being a human being and should therefore have the basic human rights that shouldn’t be denied anyone. A life begins at the moment of conception, and taking that life at any point after conception is murder. But as Thomson says a newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a human being than an acorn is an oak tree.
People study the development of the fetus in the womb to try and determine the point when it becomes a person. At conception this fertilized ovum is hardly distinguishable as a human being, but at some point it must become a human because nine months later we have a newborn baby. Parallels can be drawn between this and the analogy of the acorn and an oak tree. To draw an arbitrary line at some point during its development to mark the moment the fetus is human, is, as Thomson describes it, a “slippery slope argument.” In such arguments the exact moment will always be disputed and the answer may never be found and may not exist. So Thomson acknowledges that a fetus becomes a person well before birth, but also that newly fertilized ovum is not a person. But let’s assume, for the sake of the opposition, that a person is a person from the moment they are conceived.
Thomson claims abortion is not an issue that can only have one absolute solution. In cases where either the pregnant woman was raped, or in the instance of a contraceptive malfunction, where the woman never granted the fetus permission to live and grow inside her, abortion is morally acceptable. However, she does not argue in favor of murdering fetuses by drawing a distinction between aborting an unborn fetus, and guaranteeing its death. It would be moral to detach yourself from an unborn fetus, even if it dies, but it would not be moral to then shoot the aborted fetus in the head.
Thomson gives the metaphor of a fatally ill violinist to support her claim which goes as follows: Suppose that a famous violinist has a fatal kidney ailment, and that you alone have the right blood type to help him. You were then kidnapped and your circulatory system was plugged into his, so that your kidneys could be used to extract the poisons from his blood. Are you then morally obligated to stay in a bed next to this man and be his lifeline for as long as he needs? If everyone has a right to life, as the Pro-Life support says they do, then you are indeed obligated to do so. You have the right to decide what happens to your body, but a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens to your body. No matter the length of time the violinist needs to be plugged into you to live. Even if he will never be able to stay alive on his own, and you are then forced to be there until one of you dies. If the strain on your kidneys affects your own health and shortens your own life, your responsibility remains to keep the violinist alive, no matter what. Now apply the previous situation to the topic of abortion. The violinist is the fetus, you are the mother, and disconnecting yourself from the violinist would be to abort the fetus.
The problem with acknowledging that abortion, in any combination of these situations as moral is that you must agree with Thomson’s thesis. And no one can argue against the fact that nobody has the right to use your kidneys unless you give them permission, no one can make you give that permission-if you allow the violinist to go on using your kidneys its kindness on your part, but not the right of the violinist.
The weakest point of this argument is saying that aborting the fetus and letting it die on its own is moral. Aborting the fetus and letting it die on its own could be considered homicide by neglect. In this country we arrest the parents of neglected children, and label them unfit to be parents. Saying that letting a fetus die by neglect is acceptable, and letting a child die by neglect is not acceptable is not logical as long as we maintain that a person is human at the moment of conception. Another somewhat faulty part this argument is that it doesn’t give an absolute answer to the question of abortion. When we have a grey area like this it becomes the decision of the courts for each case, and that would add to our already backed-up legal system. Not only might the length of time necessary to see a judge be adequate to change an abortion to a murder, but time and money that especially a pregnant teenager who is unable to support a child would not be able to afford.
In conclusion, this argument is that abortion is not impermissible, but it is not always permissible either. Clearly there are situations in which abortion is the better option, and a woman does have the right to choose what is done on or in her own body. When a woman has gone through lengths to avoid pregnancy, or been raped and didn’t have a choice, her pregnancy should be hers to give up if she decides to do so. On the other hand we cannot appear to diminish the value of life simply because a baby would be an inconvenience. So we must respect life enough not to have an abortion for superficial reasons, or turn abortions into common procedures.
[1] Thomson, Judith Jarvis. A Defense of Abortion from Philosophy and Public Affairs 1,1 (Fall 1971): 47-66. Copyright 1971 by Princeton University Press, Reprinted by permission of Blackwell Publishing